Putting Cards on the Table in Iraq

By George Friedman

The clouds couldn't have been darker last
week. Everyone was talking about civil war in Iraq. Smart and informed
people were talking about the real possibility of an American airstrike
against Iran's nuclear capabilities. The Iranians were hurling defiance in
every direction on the compass. U.S. President George W. Bush seemed to be
politically on the ropes, unable to control his own party. And then
seemingly out of nowhere, the Iranians offered to hold talks with the
Americans on Iraq, and only Iraq. With the kind of lightning speed not seen
from the White House for a while, the United States accepted. Suddenly, the
two countries with the greatest stake in Iraq -- and the deepest hostility
toward each other -- had agreed publicly to negotiate on Iraq.

To
understand this development, we must understand that Iran and the United
States have been holding quiet, secret, back-channel and off-the-record
discussions for years -- but the discussions were no less important for all
of that. The Iran-Contra affair, for example, could not have taken place had
the Reagan administration not been talking to the Ayatollah Ruholla
Khomeini's representatives. There is nothing new about Americans and
Iranians talking; they have been doing it for years. Each side, for their
own domestic reasons, has tried to hide the talks from public view, even
when they were quite public, such as the Geneva discussions over Afghanistan
prior to the Sept. 11 attacks.

What is dramatically new is the public
nature of these talks now, and the subject matter: Iraq.

Not to put
too fine a point on it, but the real players in Iraq are now going to sit
down and see if they can reach some decisions about the country's future.
They are going to do this over the heads of their various clients.
Obviously, the needs of those clients will have to be satisfied, but in the
end, the Iraq war is at least partly about U.S.-Iranian relations, and it is
clear that both sides have now decided that it is time to explore a deal --
not in a quiet Georgetown restaurant, but in full view of the world. In
other words, it is time to get serious.

The offer of public talks
actually was not made by Iran. The first public proposal for talks came from
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, who several months ago reported
that he had been authorized by Bush to open two lines of discussion: One was
with the non-jihadist Sunni leadership in Iraq; the other was with Iran.
Interestingly, Khalilzad had emphasized that he was authorized to speak with
the Iranians only about Iraq and not about other subjects. In other words,
discussion of Iran's nuclear program was not going to take place. What
happened last week was that the Iranians finally gave Khalilzad an answer:
yes.

Iran's Slow Play

As we have discussed many times,
Iraq has been Iran's obsession. It is an obsession rooted in ancient
history; the Bible speaks of the struggle between Babylon and Persia for
regional hegemony. It has some of its roots in more recent history as well:
Iran lost about 300,000 people, with about 1 million more wounded and
captured, in its 1980-88 war with Iraq. That would be the equivalent of more
than 1 million dead Americans and an additional 4 million wounded and
captured. It is a staggering number. Nothing can be understood about Iran
until the impact of this war is understood. The Iranians, then, came out of
the war with two things: an utter hatred of Saddam Hussein and his regime,
and determination that this sort of devastation should never happen again.


After the United States decided, in Desert Storm, not to move on to
Baghdad and overthrow the Hussein regime -- and after the catastrophic
failure of the Shiite rising in southern Iraq -- the Iranians established a
program of covert operations that was designed to increase their control of
the Shiite population in the south. The Iranians were unable to wage war
against Hussein but were content, after Desert Storm, that he could not
attack Iran. So they focused on increasing their influence in the south and
bided their time. They could not take out Hussein, but they still wanted
someone to do so. That someone was the Americans.

Iran responded to
the 9/11 attacks in a predictable manner. First, Iran was as concerned by al
Qaeda as the United States was. The Iranians saw themselves as the vanguard
of revolutionary Islam, and they did not want to see their place usurped by
Wahhabis, whom they viewed as the tool of another regional rival, Saudi
Arabia. Thus, Tehran immediately offered U.S. forces the right to land, at
Iranian airbases, aircraft that were damaged during operations in
Afghanistan. Far more important, the Iranians used their substantial
influence in western and northern Afghanistan to secure allies for the
United States. They wanted the Taliban gone. This is not to say that some al
Qaeda operatives, having paid or otherwise induced regional Iranian
commanders, didn't receive some sanctuary in Iran; the Iranians would have
given sanctuary to Osama bin Laden if that would have neutralized him. But
Tehran's policy was to oppose al Qaeda and the Taliban, and to quietly
support the United States in its war against them. This was no stranger,
really, than the Americans giving anti-tank missiles to Khomeini in the
1980s.

But the main chance that Iran saw was getting the Americans
to invade Iraq and depose their true enemy, Saddam Hussein. The United
States was not led to invade Iraq by the Iranians -- that would be too
simple a model. However, the Iranians, with their excellent intelligence
network in Iraq, helped to smooth the way for the American decision. Apart
from providing useful tactical information, the Iranians led the Americans
to believe three things:

1. That Iraq did have weapons of mass
destruction programs.

2. That the Iraqis would not resist U.S.
operations and would greet the Americans as liberators.

3. By
omission, that there would be no post-war resistance in Iraq.

Again,
this was not decisive, but it formed an important part of the analytical
framework through which the Americans viewed Iraq.

The Iranians
wanted the United States to defeat Hussein. They wanted the United States to
bear the burden of pacifying the Sunni regions of Iraq. They wanted U.S.
forces to bog down in Iraq so that, in due course, the Americans would
withdraw -- but only after the Sunnis were broken -- leaving behind a Shiite
government that would be heavily influenced by Iran. The Iranians did
everything they could to encourage the initial engagement and then stood by
as the United States fought the Sunnis. They were getting what they
wanted.

Counterplays and Timing

What they did not count
on was American flexibility. From the first battle of Al Fallujah onward, the
United States engaged in negotiations with the Sunni leadership. The United
States had two goals: one, to use the Sunni presence in a new Iraqi
government to block Iranian ambitions; and two, to split the Sunnis from the
jihadists. It was the very success of this strategy, evident in the December
2005 elections, that caused Iraqi Shia to move away from the Iranians a bit,
and, more important, caused the jihadists to launch an anti-Shiite rampage.
The jihadists' goal was to force a civil war in Iraq and drive the Sunnis
back into an unbreakable alliance with them.

In other words, the war
was not going in favor of either the United States or Iran. The Americans
were bogged down in a war that could not be won with available manpower, if
by "victory" we mean breaking the Sunni-jihadist will to resist. The
Iranians envisioned the re-emergence of their former Baathist enemies. Not
altogether certain of the political commitments or even the political savvy
of their Shiite allies in Iraq, they could now picture their worst
nightmare: a coalition government in which the Sunnis, maneuvering with the
Kurds and Americans, would dominate an Iraqi government. They saw Tehran's
own years of maneuvering as being in jeopardy. Neither side could any longer
be certain of the outcome.

In response, each side attempted, first, to
rattle the other. Iran's nuclear maneuver was designed to render the
Americans more forthcoming; the assumption was that a nuclear Iran would be
more frightening, from the American point of view, than a Shiite Iraq. The
Americans held off responding and then, a few weeks ago, began letting it be
known that not only were airstrikes against Iran possible, but that in fact
they were being seriously considered and that deadlines were being drawn up.


This wasn't about nuclear weapons but about Iraq, as both sides made
clear when the talks were announced. Both players now have all their cards
on the table. Iran bluffed nukes, the United States called the bluff and
seemed about to raise. Khalilzad's request for talks was still on the table.
The Iranians took it. This was not really done in order to forestall
airstrikes -- the Iranians were worried about that only on the margins. What
Iran had was a deep concern and an interesting opportunity.

The
concern was that the situation in Iraq was spinning out of its control. The
United States was no longer predictable, the Sunnis were no longer
predictable, and even the Iranians' Shiite allies were not playing their
proper role. The Iranians were playing for huge stakes in Iraq and there
were suddenly too many moving pieces, too many things that could go wrong.


The Iranians also saw an opportunity. Bush's political position in
the United States had deteriorated dramatically. As it deteriorated, his
room for maneuver declined. The British had made it clear that they were
planning to leave Iraq. Bush had really not been isolated before, as his
critics always charged, but now he was becoming
isolated -- domestically as well as internationally. Bush needed badly to
break out of the political bind he was in. The administration had resisted
pressure to withdraw troops under a timetable, but it no longer was clear
whether Congress would permit Bush to continue to resist. The president did
not want his hands tied by Congress, but it seemed to the Iranians that was
exactly what was happening.

From the Iranian point of view, if ever a
man has needed a deal, it is Bush. If there are going to be any negotiations,
they are to happen now. From Bush's point of view, he does need a deal, but
so do the Iranians -- things are ratcheting out of control from Tehran's
point of view as well. For domestic Iraqi players, the room to maneuver is
increasing, while the room to maneuver for foreign players is decreasing. In
other words, the United States and Iran have, for the moment, the unified
interest of managing Iraq, rather than seeing a civil war or a purely
domestic solution.

The Next Phase of the Game

The
Iranians want at least to Finlandize Iraq. During the Cold War, the Soviets
did not turn Finland into a satellite, but they did have the right to veto
members of its government, to influence the size and composition of its
military and to require a neutral foreign policy. The Iranians wanted more,
but they will settle for keeping the worst of the Baathists out of the
government and for controls over Iraq's international behavior. The
Americans want a coalition government within the limits of a Finlandic
solution. They do not want a purely Shiite government; they want the Sunnis
to deal with the jihadists, in return for guaranteed Sunni rights in Iraq.
Finally, the United States wants the right to place a force in Iraq --
aircraft and perhaps 40,000 troops -- outside the urban areas, in the west.
The Iranians do not really want U.S. troops so close, so they will probably
argue about the number and the type. They do not want to see heavy armored
units but can live with lighter units stationed to the west.

Now
obviously, in this negotiation, each side will express distrust and
indifference. The White House won the raise by expressing doubts as to
Tehran's seriousness; the implication was that the Iranians were buying time
to work on their nukes. Perhaps. But the fact is that Tehran will work on
nukes as and when it wants, and Washington will destroy the nukes as and
when it wants. The nukes are non-issues in the real negotiations.


There are three problems now with negotiations. One is Bush's
ability to keep his coalition intact while he negotiates with a member of
the "axis of evil." Another is Iran's ability to keep its coalition together
while it negotiates with the "Great Satan." And third is the ability of
either to impose their collective will on an increasingly self-reliant Iraqi
polity. The two major powers are now ready to talk. What is not clear is
whether, even together, they will be in a position to impose their will on
the Iraqis. The coalitions will probably hold, and the Iraqis will probably
submit. But those are three "probablies." Not good.

All wars end in
negotiations. Clearly, the United States and Iran have been talking quietly
for a long time. They now have decided it is time to make their talks
public. That decision by itself indicates how seriously they both take these
conversations now.