Syria, Iran and the Power Plays over Iraq

By George Friedman

In assessing the current phase of events in
the Middle East, it is essential to link events in Syria with events in
Iran. These, in turn, must be linked to the state of the war in Iraq and
conditions in the Arabian Peninsula. The region is of one fabric, to say the
least, and it is impossible to understand unfolding events -- the pressure
against Syria involving the murder of a former Lebanese prime minister;
feints and thrusts with Iran and talk of direct political engagement with
the United States; the emergence of a new government in Baghdad, or
obstacles to one -- without viewing them as one package.

Let's begin
with two facts. Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Tehran has had close
collaborative ties with Damascus. These have not been constant, nor have
they been without strains and duplicity. Nevertheless, the entente between
Iran and Syria has been a key element. Second, one of the many goals behind
the U.S. invasion of Iraq was to position U.S. forces in such a way as to
change a series of relationships between Islamic countries, not the least of
which was the Iranian-Syrian relationship. Therefore, to understand what is
going on, we must look at this as a "key player" game (Syria, Iran and the
United States), with a serious of interested onlookers (Europe, China,
Russia, Israel), and a series of extremely anxious onlookers (the states on
the Arabian peninsula in particular).

The Roots of
Alliance

Let's begin with the issue of what bound the Iranians
and Syrians together. One part was ideological: Syria is ruled by a minority
of Alawites, a Shiite offshoot that is at odds with Sunni Islam. Iran, a
Shiite state, also confronts the Sunnis. Therefore, in religious terms,
Syria under the Assads had a common interest with Iran. Second, both states
were anti-Zionists. Syria, as a front-line state, confronted Israel alone
after Egypt's Anwar Sadat signed the accords at Camp David. Iran,
ideologically, saw itself as a committed enemy of Israel. Syria looked to
Iran for support against Israel, and Iran used that support to validate its
credential among other states -- Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia -- that were
either collaborationist or merely symbolic in their opposition to Israel's
existence. Syria and Iran could help each other, in other words, to position
themselves both against Israel and within the Islamic world.

But
ideology was not the glue that held them together: that was Saddam Hussein.
Syria's Assad and Iraq's Saddam grew out of the same ideological soil --
that of Baath socialism, a doctrine that drew together pan-Arabism with
economies dominated by the state. But rather than forming a solid front
stretching from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, the Iraqi and Syrian
brands of Baathism split into two bitterly opposed movements. That
difference had less to do with interest than with distrust between two
dynastic presidents. Syria and Iraq had few common interests and were
competing with each other economically. The relationship was, to say the
least, murderous -- if not on a national level, then on a personal one. It
never broke into open war because neither side had much to gain from a war.
It was hatred short of war.

Not so between Iraq and Iran. When Iraq
invaded Iran following the Islamic Revolution, a war lasting nearly a decade
ensued. It was a war that cost hundreds of thousands of lives -- making it,
for the size of the nations involved, one of the most brutal wars of the
20th century, and that is saying something. The issue here was fundamental.
Iran and Iraq historically were rivals for domination of the Persian Gulf.
The other countries of the Arabian Peninsula could not match either in
military strength. Thus, each had an interest in becoming the dominant
Persian Gulf power -- not only to control the oil, but to check the
political power that Saudi Arabia had as a result of oil. So long as both
were viable, the balance of power prevented domination by either. Should
either win the war, there would be no native power to resist them. Thus,
each side not only feared the other, but also had a great deal to gain
through victory.

The Iranians badly wanted the Syrians to join in
the war, creating a two-front conflict. Syria didn't. It was confronted by
Israel on the one side and Turkey, another tense rival, on the other. Should
its forces get bogged down fighting the Iraqis, the results could be
catastrophic. Besides, while the Syrians had serious issues with Iraq, their
true interests rested in Lebanon. The Syrians have always argued, with some
justification, that Lebanon was torn from Syrian territory by the
Sykes-Picot agreements between France and Britain following World War II.
Nationalism aside, the Syrian leadership had close -- indeed, intimate --
economic relationships in Lebanon. It is important to recall that when Syria
invaded Lebanon in 1975, it was in opposition to the Palestinians and in
favor of Maronite Christian families, with whom the Alawites had critical
business and political relations. It was -- and is -- impossible to think of
Lebanon except in the context of Syria.

A Delicate Web of
Relations

It was Damascus' fundamental interest for Lebanon to be
informally absorbed into a greater Syria. Damascus used many tools, many
relationships, many threats, many opportunities to weave a relationship with
Lebanon and extend Syrian influence throughout the state. One of those tools
was Hezbollah, an Islamist Shiite militia heavily funded and supported by
Iran. From the Syrian point of view, Hezbollah had many uses. For one thing,
it put a more secular Shiite group, the Amal movement under Nabih Berri, on
the defensive. For another, it helped to put the Bekaa Valley, a major
smuggling route for drugs and other commodities, under Syrian domination.
Finally, it allowed Syria to pose a surrogate threat to Israel, retaining
its anti-Zionist credentials without directly confronting Israel and
incurring the risk of retaliation.

For Iran, Hezbollah was a means
for asserting its claim on leadership of radical Islam while putting
orthodox Sunnis, like the Saudis, in an uncomfortable position. Iran was
fighting Israel via Hezbollah and building structures for a revolutionary
Islam, while the dominant Sunnis were collaborating with the supporters of
Israel, the United States. Hezbollah was, for the Iranians, a low-risk,
high-payoff investment. In addition, it opened the door for financial
benefits in the Wild West of Lebanon.

Both Iran and Syria maintained
complex relations with both the United States and Israel. For example, Syria
and Israel -- formally at war -- developed during the 1980s and 1990s complex
protocols for preventing confrontation. Neither wanted a war with the other.
The Syrians helped keep Hezbollah operations within limits and maintained
security structures in such a way that Israel did not have to wage a major
conventional war against Syria after 1982. There was far more
intelligence-sharing and business deal-making than either Jerusalem or
Damascus would want to admit. Lebanon recovered from its civil war and
prospered -- as did Syrian and Israeli businessmen.

Iran also had
complex relations with Washington. During the Iran-Iraq war, the United
States found it in its interests to maintain a balance of power between
Baghdad and Tehran. It did not want either to win. Toward this end, as Iran
weakened, the United States arranged to provide military aid to Tehran --
not surprisingly, through Israel. Israel had maintained close relations with
the Iranian military during the Shah's rule, and not really surprisingly,
those endured under the Ayatollah Khomeini as well. Khomeini wanted to
defeat Saddam Hussein more than anything. His military needed everything
from missiles to spare parts, and the United States was prepared to use
Israeli channels to supply them. It must always be remembered that the
Iran-Contra affair was not only about Central America. It was also -- and
far more significantly -- about selling weapons to Iran via the
Israelis.

Intersection: Iraq

Now, if we go back up to
50,000 feet, we will see the connecting tissue in all these relationships:
Iraq. There were plenty of side issues. But the central issue was that
everyone hated Iraq. No one wanted Iraq to get nuclear weapons. We have
always wondered about Iran's role in Israel's destruction of the Osirak
reactor in 1981; but no matter here. The point is that the containment of
Iraq was in everyone's interest. Indeed, the United States merely wanted to
contain Iraq, whereas Iran, Syria and Israel all had an interest in
destroying it.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq was in the direct interest
of two countries, in addition to the United States: Iran and Israel. Other
countries had a more ambiguous response. The Saudis, for example, were as
terrified of Iran as of Iraq. They, more than anyone, wanted to see the
balance of power maintained and viewed the American invasion as threatening
to their interests.

Syria's position was the most
complex.

Syria had joined the coalition fighting Saddam Hussein
during Desert Storm -- at least symbolically. The Syrians had complex
motives, but they did not want the United States interfering with their
interests in Lebanon and saw throwing in with the coalition as a means of
assuring a benign U.S. policy. At the same time, Syria was in the most
precarious strategic position of any country in the region. Sandwiched
between Israel, Turkey and Iraq, it lived on the lip of a volcano. The
outcome of Desert Storm was perfect for the Syrians: It castrated Iraq
without destroying it. Thus, Damascus needed to deal with only two threats:
Israel, which had grown comfortable with its position in Lebanon, and
Turkey, which was busy worrying about its Kurdish problem. In general, with
some exceptions, the 1990s were as good as it got for Syria.

The U.S.
invasion in 2003 upset the equation. Now Syria was surrounded by enemies on
all sides again, but this time one of the enemies was the United States --
and immediately at the end of conventional military operations, the United
States rushed forces to the Iraq-Syria border, threatening hot pursuit of
the fleeing Baathists. The Syrians had not calculated the American
intervention, having believed claims by Saudi Arabia and France that the
United States would not invade without their approval. Now Syria was in
trouble.

Syria and Iran: A Parallel Play

For the
Iranians, this was the golden moment. Their dream was of a pro-Iranian Iraq
-- or, alternatively, for Iraq's Shiite region to be independent and
pro-Iranian, or at least to have a neutral Iraq. The Sunni rising put the
Iranians in a perfect position: Using their influence among the Shia, they
held the cards that the Americans had dealt them. They adopted a strategy of
waiting and spinning complex webs.

The Syrians saw themselves in a
much less advantageous position. They were in their worst-case scenario.
They could not engage the United States directly, of course. But the only
satisfactory outcome to their dilemma was to divert U.S. attention from them
or, barring that, so complicate the Americans' position that they would be
prevented from making any aggressive moves toward Syria. What Damascus
needed was a strong guerrilla war to tie the Americans down.

The
Syrians hated the Iraqi Baathists, but they now had two interests in common:
First, a guerrilla war in Iraq would help to protect Syria as well as the
Baathists' interests; and second, the Iraqis were paying cash for Syrian
support -- and the Syrians like cash. They had been selling services to the
Iraqis during the run-up to the war, and once the war was over, they
continued to do so. The strategy proved rational: Syrian support for the
Sunni guerrillas and jihadists was important in bogging the Americans
down.

The Iranians liked it too. The more bogged down the Americans
were in the Sunni region, the more dependent they were on the Shia. At the
very least, they urgently needed Iraq's Shia not to rise up. At most, they
wanted the Shia to form the core of a new government. From the Iranian point
of view, the Sunni guerrillas were despicable as the enemies of Shiite Iran
and yet were the perfect tool to increase their control over the Americans.


Thus, as before, Syria and Iran were engaged in parallel play. They
shared a natural interest in a weak Iraq. If the United States was the
dominant power in Iraq, then they wanted the United States to be the weak
power. For a very long time, the United States was unable to get out of the
way of the complexities it had created. It used the Iranian Shia and then,
when trying to pull away from them, would stumble and return to dependence.
And while Iraqi and Iranian Shia are not the same by any means, in this
particular case, both had the same interest: increased leverage over the
Americans.

The United States had two possible strategies. The key to
controlling Iraq lay in ending the guerrilla war. One part of the guerrilla
war -- not all -- was in Syria. The United States could invade Syria -- not
a good idea, given available forces. It could ask Israel to do it -- which
would be a bad move politically, nor was it clear that Israel wanted to do
this. Or, it could use a strategy of indirection.

The Situation at
Hand

The thing that Syria wants more than anything is Lebanon. The
United States has set in motion policies designed to force Syria out of
Lebanon. It is not that the United States really cares who dominates Lebanon
-- in fact, its Israeli allies rather like the control that Syria has
introduced there. Nevertheless, by threatening its core interests, the
United States could, leaders thought, begin to leverage Syria.

The
Syrians were obviously not going to go quietly into that good night -- not
with billions at stake. The assassination of Rafik al-Hariri was the answer.
Even when Syria drew its overt military forces out of Lebanon, covert force
remained there perpetually. The result of the assassination, however, was
overwhelming pressure on Syria -- coupled with a not-too-convincing threat
of the use of force by the United States.

For Iran, the fate of Syria
is not a major national interest. The future of Iraq is. Iran's view of
events in Iraq is divided into three parts: First, a belief that Syria is an
important but not decisive source of support for the Sunni guerillas; second,
the view that the United States has already maneuvered itself into a de facto
alliance with a faction of Iraq's Sunnis; and finally, the belief that Iran's
interests in Iraq were not endangered by evolving politics in
Lebanon.

The most important feature of the landscape at this moment
is the decision by Iran that it is time to move toward direct discussions
with the United States. To be sure, the United States and Iran have been
talking informally for years about a variety of things, including Iraq. But
this week, the Iranian foreign minister did two things. First, he stated
that the time was not yet right for talks with the United States -- while
acknowledging that talks through intermediaries had taken place. And second,
he described the conditions under which discussions might occur. In short, he
set the stage for talks between Washington and Tehran to move into the public
eye.

It appears at this point that Iran has taken note of the U.S.
pressure against Syria and is adjusting for it. However, what is holding up
progress on public talks between the United States and Iran are not the
reasons stated by the foreign minister -- doubts about Washington's
integrity and unclarity about its goals -- but rather, the status
of the presidency in Washington. Support for President George W. Bush is
running at 39 percent in the polls. He still hasn't bounced upward, and he
still hasn't collapsed. He is balanced on the thin edge of the knife.
Indictments in the Plame
investigation might come this week, which would be pivotal. If Bush
collapses, there is no point in talks for Tehran.

Thus, the Iranians
are waiting to see two things: Does the United States really have the weight
to back the Syrians into a corner? And can Bush survive the greatest crisis
of his presidency?

The Middle East is not a simple place, but it is a
predictable one. Power talks, and you-know-what walks.