U.S.-Indian Relations and the Geopolitical System

By George Friedman

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is in
Washington and has addressed a joint session of Congress. Most visiting
heads of government don't get that privilege, but Singh is no ordinary
leader. The Indo-American relationship is emerging as one of the foundations
of the global system. For the United States, India -- particularly since 9/11
-- has come to represent a strategic partner in the U.S.-jihadist war: By its
very existence as a U.S. ally, it serves to keep the pressure for cooperation
very high on rival Pakistan. For India, the United States has come to
represent an alternative to its former relationship with the Soviet Union,
which helped to guarantee India's regional interests. Thus, Singh's visit,
while dealing with a range of the normal minutiae of international
relations, represents confirmation that something of fundamental importance
has happened.

Unlike many summits, this particular one has had the
look, feel and substance of a significant event. Foreign leaders do not
usually get to address Congress. The entire tone of the meetings implied a
significant turning point. But in this case, the concrete agreements were as
important as the symbolism: Significant deals were signed.

The most
publicly significant was a deal giving the Indians access to American
nuclear technology for civilian uses. India became a nuclear power in 1974,
against strong U.S. opposition. The decision to give India nuclear
technology -- even for civilian uses -- marks a sea change in American
thinking about India's nuclear capability. To be more precise, it marks the
culmination of a sea change. Washington used a series of severe,
near-nuclear crises between India and Pakistan following the Sept. 11
attacks to leverage Islamabad toward greater cooperation with the United
States. It was clear then that the United States was changing its view of
India "on the fly." This new agreement represents a public affirmation that
Washington regards India's nuclear capabilities as non-threatening to
American interests and, indeed, as a potential asset.

In agreeing to
increase India's nuclear technology base, albeit only for civilian uses and
under international supervision, the United States is affirming that a
special relationship exists with India.

At the same time that this
public agreement was being reached, official leaks from the Pentagon said
that India would begin purchasing up to $5 billion worth of conventional
weapons, once Congress approves the deal. This requires an act of Congress
because current law on non-proliferation bars the sale of a wide array of
military technology to countries that have acquired nuclear weapons --
specifically focusing on any technology that might be useful to a nuclear
weapons program. Since the technologies that are potentially useful are
amazingly diverse, large swathes of technology are excluded from sale.
Should Congress approve the bill, it would place India in a position similar
to that of Israel (save that Israel doesn't acknowledge publicly that it has
nuclear weapons).

The things being sold to India are also
interesting. For example, India will be allowed to purchase Aegis
technology, which is designed to protect naval vessels -- and battle groups
-- from anti-ship missiles. So far, only Japan has acquired the technology,
partly because of its cost. In addition, New Delhi will be able to purchase
anti-submarine patrol aircraft. The United States, which until a few years
ago regarded the Indian naval build-up -- based on Soviet technology -- as a
threat to U.S. control of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, has now completely
reversed its posture. It is selling New Delhi naval technology that will
allow the Indians to fulfill one of their key strategic objectives, which is
to be able to control regional sea lanes. The United States would not be
providing this technology without having achieved a far-reaching strategic
agreement with New Delhi.

This, by the way, has the Pakistanis
worried. Islamabad clearly understands that its status as Washington's ally
in the U.S.-jihadist war will go only so far in terms of duration and
dividends for Pakistan. In other words, while India gets a long-term
strategic relationship with the United States, Pakistan's relationship is
viewed as short-term and tactical.

To understand the major shift
taking place between Washington and New Delhi, it is important to understand
the geopolitical context that created it. Almost from the beginning, there
were tensions between the United States and India. India's formal position
was non-alignment between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was one
of the founders and leaders of the non-aligned movement. Apart from its
formal position, India had fundamental problems with the geopolitical stance
of the United States, which during the Cold War was heavily focused on
developing Muslim allies.

The primary interest of the United States
was the containment of the Soviet Union. This inevitably caused Washington
to focus on two predominantly Muslim countries that bordered the Soviet
Union: Turkey and Iran. American strategy could not work if either of these
nations were not allied with the United States, and Washington did
everything it could to assure their alignment, including engineering a coup
in Iran in 1953. The focus on Muslim countries extended beyond these two.
The Americans did not want their rear and flanks turned by the Soviets; the
United States and Britain, therefore, focused on both Syria and Iraq as well
as on the Arabian Peninsula. It is important to recall that during the 1950s
the United States had rather cool relations with Israel; it was pursuing a
pro-Muslim strategy out of geopolitical necessity.

During the 1950s,
the Indians were the ones with a Muslim problem. The partition of India into
Muslim- and Hindu-majority nations had created Pakistan, which represented
India's primary national security concern. In looking at India's geography,
it should be noted that in many ways, India is an island. Its northern
boundary essentially consists of the Himalayas, impassable for any
substantial military force. Its eastern frontier faces tropical jungles.
Most of its borders consist of ocean. Only to the west, where Pakistan lies,
did there exist a strategic threat. It is true that what is today Bangladesh
was part of Pakistan in those years, but it never posed a strategic threat.
As the crow flies, the Pakistani border is only a couple of hundred miles
from Delhi and Bombay; that was not a trivial concern.

The United
States was pursuing the Muslim world. The Indians saw themselves as
threatened by the Muslim world. U.S. and Indian interests, already strained
by ideology, diverged fundamentally. India needed a counterweight to the
United States and found it in the Soviet Union. Though it never became
Communist, India became an ally of the Soviets. The Indians built their
armed forces on a foundation of Soviet technology, and their highly
bureaucratized economy found some commonality with the Soviets.

From
a purely strategic point of view, the Indo-Soviet relationship did not mean
all that much. Even after the Sino-Soviet split, the direct impact that
India or the Soviets could have on each other's strategic situation was
severely limited. India was never the military counterweight to China that
the Soviets needed -- not because its forces couldn't challenge the Chinese,
but because geography prevented the two forces from coming to grips with each
other. People speak of Sino-Indian competition -- and there was a war (though
not one that could threaten the survival of either nation) between India and
China in 1962 in the Himalayas -- but the fact is that the two countries
could be ten thousand miles apart for the extent to which geography permits
any meaningful interaction. India's isolation limited the significance of
its confrontation with the Soviets. The value of the relationship was
marginalized by geography.

India therefore became marginal to the
international system. Its major point of contact was with Pakistan, with
which it had fought a series of wars -- major ones in 1948, 1965 and 1971 --
had serious territorial issues and deep distrust. Pakistan was supported by
the United States and China, the two anti-Soviet powers in the 1970s and
1980s. This was partly due to India's relationship with the Soviets and
partly due to American interests in the Islamic world.


Marginalization is the key concept for understanding India's
position in the world prior to 2001. Geography prevented it from having
substantial interaction with the great powers. Its point of contact,
Pakistan, was of some importance, but not decisive importance. Prior to
becoming a nuclear power, India had only one recourse: naval power. But its
economy would not support a full-blooded fleet-building program. Its
strength was in its army, but that army could not be projected
anywhere.

Its economy was also marginalized. Built on a socialist
model that took the worst from Soviet planning and Western markets, the
Indian economy isolated itself by laws that severely limited outside
investment. Its infrastructure did not develop and, while several key
industries -- pharmaceuticals and electronics -- emerged, this never created
the fabric of what might be called a national economy. India was a huge,
fragmented country, on the margins of the international system. Its
friendship with the Soviets and its enmity with the United States were tepid
on all sides.

Then came the 9/11 strikes, and the American
relationship with the Islamic world was transformed almost overnight.
Suddenly, Pakistan became a critical piece of the United States' long-term
war plan, and therefore India became an extremely valuable asset. The
Indians understood two things. First, that as marginalized as they had been
in the Cold War, they had become irrelevant to the international system in
the post-Cold War period prior to 9/11. Second, they understood that the
U.S.-jihadist war could become India's entry into the broader international
system.

U.S.-Indian collaboration began intensely shortly after 9/11.
Part of it consisted of a mutual interest in manipulating Pakistan; part of
it had broader implications. As the United States began to view the Muslim
world as an unreliable and threatening entity, it started to see India in
the same light as Israel. It was a potentially powerful ally that, in spite
of its hostility to the Islamic world, or perhaps because of it, could be
extremely useful. Long, complex negotiations ensued, leading up the present
summit. The terms of endearment, so to speak, were defined. A range of
issues on which the two sides could collaborate emerged.

A
not-so-hidden issue at the summit in Washington was China. Sino-U.S.
relations are deteriorating fairly rapidly. There was much speculation about
India being an Asian counterweight to China. We have no idea what this means,
since geographically China and India occupy two very different Asias. The
United States doesn't need a nuclear counterweight to China, and China is
very far from becoming a major naval power capable of projecting force
outside of its regional waters. By that, we do not mean sailing into these
waters, but fighting, winning battles and sailing home. The nuclear
technology agreement that Singh obtained in Washington increases the
likelihood that China is not going to project force west of Singapore. On
the other hand, it was never likely to do so.

There is, however,
another dimension to this. For a generation, China has been the place where
hot money in search of high returns was destined. It was where the action
was. It is no longer that place, except in the minds of the nostalgic and
delusional. But India could well be. If one thinks of China in 1980, the
notion that its bureaucracy, lack of infrastructure and a culture
antithetical to rapid development would yield the economic powerhouse of
2000 would have been unthinkable. It was unthinkable.

India is in
China's position of 1980. It has a mind-boggling bureaucracy, poor
infrastructure and a culture antithetical to rapid development. At the same
time, it has the basic materials that China built on. As the Sino-U.S.
relationship deteriorates, India can be a counterweight to China -- not in a
military sense, but in an economic sense. If the United States has an
economic alternative to China for investment, Washington develops leverage
in its talks with Beijing on a host of issues. China, after all, still
courts investment -- even as the Chinese buy anything that isn't Chinese.


Another factor underscoring the significance of the shift in
Indo-U.S. relations is New Delhi's relationship with Tehran. India's
relations with Iran have always been a serious point of contention and
concern for the United States. However, due to the situation in Iraq,
tensions with New Delhi over this issue are on the decline. The United
States and Iran at the moment are developing parallel interests, each with
their own reasons to work together to ensure the success of the fledgling
Shia-dominated government in Baghdad.

The Indo-American relationship
did not develop out of the subjective good will of the leaders. The Sept. 11
attacks created a dynamic that couldn't be resisted, and that created a
reality that the Bush-Singh summit confirmed. It doesn't transform the
world, but it changes it fundamentally. India will come out of this a very
different country, and the United States will look at the Indian Ocean Basin
in a very different way.

Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.

© Copyright 2005 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.